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Tom Wicker's A Time to Die' is multilayered. On one level, it is
history; on a second, political philosophy; on a third, autobiography;
and on a final level, an appeal for prison reform. Above all, however,
it is good writing. Like all good writing, even consciously autobio-
graphical writing, it tells more about the author than the author
intends-which, given Wicker's position as the archetypical establish-
ment rebel, may be the real significance of the book.
A Time to Die is a history of the Attica rebellion. Wicker describes
it as a comedy of errors-except for the end result. As is appropriate
for a classic comedy, the errors result from the actors' misperceptions
of reality. Of the inmates' misperceptions, the most ironic was their
belief, despite their publicly expressed fears, that the state would take
no action to end the uprising. As Wicker notes, "many of these de-
spised inmates finally had not believed that the state-society, The
Man-would shoot them down."
' 2
There were probably two reasons for the inmates' blindness to the
realities of the situation. First, they suffered from a curiously American
innocence which led them to assume that their opponents would not
only refrain from taking action against them but would even assist
them, because the inmates were "good" and their opponents were
"bad." Even Wicker was somewhat bemused by this confidence in the
unaided "virtue" of their cause: "Many of its participants and sup-
porters regarded it less as a power play ... than as a proper condition
in itself, of greater validity than the restoration of accustomed author-
ity.... Many inmates seemed to think it was the administration's duty
to sustain the revolt-by food, water, medical care, etc.-rather than to
end it."3
Second, the inmates failed to realize that actions which they regarded
as posturing would be taken far more seriously by the state. Thus, as
preparations for the final assault mounted, the inmates attempted to
"t Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University; Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. T. WICKER, A TIME To DIE (1975) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. P. 309.
3. P. 63 (emphasis in original).
Wicker at Attica
bluff the authorities by taking eight of the hostages to spots visible to
the state troopers and menacing each hostage with a knife or some
form of blade. The authorities understandably took the bluff as a real
threat and acted accordingly.4 For their inabilfty to accept the real
implications of their revolutionary act, which forced even a liberal
state government to employ force to preserve its ultimate authority,
the inmates paid a heavy price.
If the inmates underestimated the willingness of the state to use
force, they also overestimated their ability to withstand the use of such
force. There was a "Catch 22" aspect to their possession of the hostages:
"Power derived from the custody of the hostages in their miserable
ring could be political power only as long as they were alive to be
threatened by the blades, and maybe not even that long. The power of
the inmates actually was enough to gain them a hearing and maintain
a stalemate only while the state held the lives of the hostages dearer
than it held the control of its institution."' Accordingly, the prisoners'
demand that they be flown to a third-world country,6 or their demand
for total amnesty for the uprising-an uprising which resulted in the
murder of one guard and the beating of a number of others, as well
as the murder of three prisoners-was totally unrealistic. What Wicker
himself never completely understood was that the state would sacri-
fice the lives of the hostages rather than surrender to demands which
negated its sovereignty.7
Given the essential weakness of the inmates' position, the best they
could achieve was certain specified prison reforms, a commitment that
there would not be indiscriminate retaliation for the uprising, and
replacement of the warden. Tragically, no attempt was ever made by
the inmates' leaders or the observers to apprise them of the true nature
of their situation. Indeed, the inmates' own leaders failed them at
crucial moments because of fear that decisive action would cost them
their leadership position. Shortly after the revolt began, Roger Chain-
pen, one of the most respected jailhouse lawyers, stood by silently as
other inmate leaders denounced a federal injunction designed to limit
reprisals for the uprising, even though he had helped draft the docu-
ment and knew that it represented the best possible deal.s Similarly,
Richard Clark, another inmate leader, ripped up the paper containing
the 28 reforms that the prison authorities had agreed to undertake. 9
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The observers did not do much better. None of them recom-
mended the acceptance of the 28 points conceded by the prison au-
thorities. Bobby Seale, much to Wicker's disgust, avoided the ques-
tion completely for fear of losing his constituency.10 On one occasion,
William Kunstler and Arthur Eve not only failed to warn the inmates
that the rejection of the 28 points would result in the use of force but
rather aroused unrealistic hopes by discussions of the possibility of
amnesty and asylum in the third world. 1 Perhaps such a recommenda-
tion would have been rejected. "But the straw lay there to be grasped
at, that September afternoon in the fading light of D-yard. Wicker
saw it clearly. He did not doubt the imperative to speak that had been
placed upon him by the realization. Fear, not least for his own safety,
offered its insidious counsel, but he understood that the possibilities
were as unclear one way as the other, whether he spoke or did not. He
knew what was expected of him, what he expected of himself. ... But
he did not speak .... -12
The tragedy, however, owed as much to the shortsightedness of the
authorities as to the inmates' misperceptions. A society which failed
to understand or reform the inequities of the prison system 13 cannot
escape responsibility for the consequences of an inevitable rebellion.
Moreover, in some ways the state misunderstood the nature and moti-
vations of the inmates who rebelled against a degrading system. As
Wicker noted: "All the state officials, all the observers-so far as he
knew-had believed explicitly that the inmates would kill the hostages
if D-yard was attacked. But the inmates had not done it.... The hard
truth was that the Attica brothers had had more faith in the state than
the state had had in them. Both had been wrong."' 4 However, Wicker's
own actions and fears, as well as the inmates' threats against the ob-
servers, 1 suggest that the attitude of the state authorities was not with-
out some basis.
The state also committed major blunders in the planning and con-
duct of the final assault. The basic goal of the assault was to rescue
the hostages, not to retake the prison, since the prison could be cap-
tured without difficulty once the hostages were freed. This goal
could be achieved only if the assault were made by a small band of
highly trained men who could rescue the hostages with a minimum
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troopers, exhausted by four days of nervous waiting and more in-
terested in venting their animosity on the inmates than in saving the
hostages." The result was a massacre, not just of the inmates but of the
hostages whose rescue was the aim of the assault.
However, A Time to Die is more than a critical history of the
Attica revolt. It is a statement of Wicker's commitment to humanism
and moderation-a statement made because of, rather than in spite of,
the failure of both humanism and moderation at Attica. At the core
of Wicker's thinking is the recognition that a perfect society cannot be
erected by imperfect men: "Wicker believed something else, too,
which he doubted that political believers like William Kunstler really
understood-that there was little reason to have faith in any society
that men and women might be able to establish, if that faith demanded
the elimination of injustice .... People could change any society, but
no society could change people. Therefore, as Wicker saw it, the aim
of a society of men could be at best to limit injustice; and its true
measure was the value, if any, that it placed on that goal. Thus, talk
of revolution and overthrow made Wicker uncomfortable intellec-
tually. What he knew of history impelled him to ask: Overthrow society
and replace it with what? With what old injustice to what new vic-
tim?"'17 While the revolutionary was willing to sacrifice everything to
create the new order, Wicker was unwilling to sacrifice anything,
least of all human life, for a new society. To the humanist, man, rather
than society, is the measure of all things, and human life is the ultimate
value.' 8 If the preservation of life is the end of humanism, moderation
and compromise are its essential methods. As the assault was launched,
Wicker was left thinking to himself that the tragedy could have been
averted: "[H]e would call someone, anyone, who could sit at a table
with others in a quiet law office somewhere and work out a com-
promise arrangement, the kind of compromise arrangement that was
worked out every day, every hour, in every kind of situation, when
interests conflicted and men wanted compromise."'1
The politics of moderation failed at Attica. 20 Wicker suggests that
this failure was due to the fact "that the novel process in which they
were involved could be scarcely rational at all, either on the part of
the state or on the part of the inmates-rational, that is, in the sense
that each side could pursue its interest coldly, rather than yielding to
16. P. 214.
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passions, prejudices, fear, and hatred."2 ' Much of A Time to Die ex-
emplifies Coleridge's adage that history is philosophy teaching by ex-
ample. Wicker ruthlessly judges those not committed to humanism. His
description of the incident in which Bobby Seale carelessly throws to
the floor a note with the message, "Brother Bobby, our lives are in
your hands. Come! Attica prisoners,"22 is a searing indictment not only
of Seale but of all political leaders who place political expediency
ahead of human needs. His description of William Kunstler is hardly
more flattering: "Yet Wicker could not help but wonder whether
Kunstler's fervor was not to some extent what he and his clients would
call an 'ego trip,' and whether it served deserving clients any better
than solid, nonpolitical legal counsel .... -23 And he is also critical
of Governor Rockefeller's reluctance to come to Attica.
2 4
Indeed, the only individuals at Attica who emerge with any credit
are the moderates. Among those is Harlem publisher and businessman
Clarence Jones, who at the risk of his own personal safety urged moder-
ation by both the inmates and the state.25 Oswald, the beleaguered head
of the state prison system who made unparalleled efforts to end the At-
tica revolt without bloodshed, is also praised: "Oswald obviously had
been fighting a rearguard action against his own professional col-
leagues; and Wicker believed that Oswald's desire for a peaceful settle-
ment was not only sincere but professionally courageous. "20 Even the
much despised Warden Mancusi is praised for offering to resign in an
effort to achieve a settlement without bloodshed after learning that the
inmates' two nonnegotiable demands were for amnesty and his
dismissal.
2 7
On the most significant level, A Time to Die is autobiography. In-
terwoven with the story of the revolt are flashbacks to episodes from
Wicker's life: his boyhood in North Carolina, his military service, his
career in journalism, and his one prior brush with death. The con-
sciously autobiographical aspect of the book is due in large part to
Wicker's conviction that Attica marked a crucial time in his life.2
His marriage was on the verge of dissolution,2 9 his literary career was
at a standstill,30 and his endeavors to utilize his journalistic position to
21. P. 45.
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achieve a better society had been unsuccessful. 31 He felt an emptiness
because of his desire to commit himself to causes, while his insistence
upon remaining an observer rather than a participant prevented him
from doing so.
32
A Time to Die is thus a story of Wicker's rite of passage: "At Attica,
he might no longer be able to play his easy, familiar role of privileged
onlooker."33 It posed, however, a test that he was eager to meet: "How-
ever little he might actually belong there, his life and work had
brought him to Attica, almost as if to demand of him that he validate
the work by committing the life .... [H]e had had a good, long run
for it; he had come a long way before they laid a glove on him."
3 4
And at Attica, he made his commitment-in some ways. He abandoned
his journalistic impartiality to threaten Bobby Douglas, the Governor's
representative, with the power of his columns in the New York Times
if Rockefeller refused to come to Attica.3 5 He took his life into his
hands when he made the final visit to D-yard: "He respected Lew
Steel's opinion that none of the observers could safely return to the
yard, particularly the white ones.... On the other hand .. . if much
always had been expected of Tom Wicker, at least by himself, not all
that much had been delivered. And he knew, that Sunday morning...
that he must either finally meet his own expectations for himself or
abandon them and his idea of who and what he was." 36 Then, he
waffled. While in D-yard, he, like most of the other players in the
tragedy, tried to protect his own interests. He pleaded with the inmate
leaders not to prompt him in front of the news cameras when he was
interviewing the hostages, lest he appear to be their tool.3T He failed
to speak when the time came for him to do so: "They had all failed.
... But Wicker believed he had witnessed, had been part of, a pro-
found human failure, too-a failure of understanding, of courage, of
intelligence, above all a failure of the human spirit. He did not know
how much of that failure was rightfully his alone to bear. But it was
enough, he knew, enough for anyone." 3s
The historical-autobiographical flow of A Time to Die is interrupted
at four points by essays on the history and present nature of the prison
system.39 These excursions explain the conditions which made the
31. P. 164.
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Attica uprising inevitable and present the case for prison reform. For
Wicker, the high recidivism rate proves the failure of our prison sys-
tem. He claims that prisons fulfill none of the roles assigned to them.
They do not rehabilitate, they do not deter, and they do not segregate
criminals from the rest of society. 40 Accordingly, he concludes that
they are ineffective 4' and even that "the idea of prison was wrong.
' 4
2
Unfortunately, the evidence for his conclusions and the logic of his
arguments are not impressive.
Certainly Wicker is right in his basic observation that prisons do
not have any substantial rehabilitative effect. Indeed, this fact is evi-
dent to anyone who has examined the numerous studies of recidivism
cited by Wicker. 43 Moreover, it is clear, as Wicker points out, that
"there is no known penological approach that achieves a significantly
lower rate of recidivism." 44 That is hardly surprising, though, since
there is no known formula for producing "the awakening of self-respect
[which] seems to be indispensable to any real 'rehabilitation' of an
offender."
45
Wicker's conclusions about the deterrent effects of prison are con-
siderably more dubious. He recognizes that some studies have shown
that the threat of punishment does deter criminal conduct, but sug-
gests that the deterrent effect is limited solely to the middle class. 46 He
also implies that the deterrent effect cannot be very great since "crime
rates have been rising despite the almost automatic recourse of courts
to prison sentences for most convicted offenders. ' 47 This last statement
is inaccurate, for the rising crime rate has been paralleled by an in-
creased reluctance upon the part of the courts to imprison convicted
criminals, especially for first offenses. In addition, the chances have
diminished that a criminal will be convicted, let alone imprisoned, for
a given offense. To most observers, the connection between the in-
creasing rate of crime and the decreasing rate of imprisonment would
be obvious.
Wicker's discussion of the "quarantine" effects of imprisonment is
also flawed. He does recognize that "prison does not really separate and
segregate criminals from society-not for any great length of time. In
1970, for example, the national average prison term was 28 months
40. Pp. 108-12.
41. Pp. 34, 112.






Vol. 85: 150, 1975
Wicker at Attica
. ,"48 Again, however, he fails to consider whether, in view of the
known statistics about recidivism, the decreasing length of prison terms
has any relationship to the increasing crime rate. On the contrary,
Wicker suggests that increasing the length of the prison term might
increase the crime rate since some statistics show that "the longer the
term, the likelier the inmate is to recidivate." 49 For this proposition,
he refers only to a study showing that a group of Florida prisoners
released before their terms had expired had a lower rate of recidivism
than did another group released after their terms had been completed.50
The most puzzling feature of Wicker's analysis of this problem is
his failure to recognize that an important cause of recidivism is the
difficulty former inmates have in finding a job after being released
from prison. Penalizing the ex-convict by unreasonably restricting his
opportunities for employment is both unfair, because he has paid the
price exacted by society for the wrong he has committed, and unwise,
because a man will sooner rob than starve. Perhaps Wicker attaches
little significance to this difficulty-despite his contacts with several
inmates who had encountered great difficulty finding employment
after serving previous sen'tences5-because it suggests that the real solu-
tion to the crime problem lies not in the abolition of prisons but in
helping to reintegrate the released inmate into society.
Wicker's intense commitment to prison reform has colored his anal-
ysis. Indeed, the best explanation for the weakness of the analysis is
given by Wicker himself in criticizing Kunstler: "[T]he more 'com-
mitted' a person was ... the more the 'commitment' became acceptance
of an ideological position, and therefore the less intellectually in-
dependent the committed person could be." 2 Wicker gives us clues to
the sources of this commitment in his own upbringing. From earliest
childhood, Wicker had been taught that he was set apart from and
superior to ordinary men. 3 Wicker saw manifested in worldly success
his possession of inner superiority-of grace, as his Puritan forebears
would have termed it. However, his success left him uneasy. 54
Against this background, two powerful motives appear for his in-
volvement in prison reform and his mission to Attica: vanity and
guilt. When he received his summons to Attica-appropriately enough,
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the National Geographic-he marveled that "[i]t was possible .. . that
those unknown, faraway prisoners could think of him in some way as
sympathetic to their plight. He thought he might be the only daily
newspaper writer of his time to whom such men would think they
could appeal."5 He caught the first plane "because of a certain faint
pride at having been asked for help by men who had so few to whom
they could turn." 6
Wicker's identification with the inmates at Attica not only gratifies
his vanity; it frees him of his sense of guilt. As he made his first visit
to D-yard, "he was beginning to feel certain emotional links to men
who had seemed so far removed."' 7 He concluded that the inmates are
the victimized and that society is the victimizer: "Wicker could not
help but think how relative were the judgements of men. Thieves and
murderers compared to whom? Prisoners of society due to what ac-
cidents and perversions of the same society?" 8 This process of identi-
fication reached its climax in his last visit to D-yard, when he shook
hands with and then embraced an unknown black youth: "'We gonna
win, brother,' Wicker said. 'We gonna win.' The boy smiled and
nodded and Wicker walked on, thinking he was free at last free
at last."5 9
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